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Abstract: We experimentally investigate the distribution of children’s
time preferences along gender and racial lines. We find that boys are more
impatient than girls and black children are no more impatient than white
children. However, this pattern hides the fact that black boys have the high-
est discount rates of all groups. Most importantly, we show that impatience
has a direct effect on behavior. An increase of one standard deviation in the
discount rate increases the probability that a child has at least 3 disciplinary
referrals by 5 percent. Time preferences might play a large role in setting
appropriate incentives for children.
* The authors thank Laura Jordan and Lindy Pruitt for their invaluable as-
sistance in coordinating and implementing the experiments. We also thank the
administrators and teachers at Cowan Road and Taylor Street Middle Schools for
their help in conducting the experiments.
1 Introduction
According to the 2000 Georgia population census, only 14 percent of black
men and 20 percent of black women between 25 and 35 years of age have a
college degree. In comparison, 32 percent of white men and 36 percent of
white women in the same age group hold a college degree. Despite massive
subsidies for higher education in the state of Georgia,1 a growing Black-White
educational gap is apparent. While white women and men increased their
percent of college educated by 11 points in this period, black women did it
only by 6 points and black men by 4 points. A gender gap in educational
achievement among Blacks is clear as well. Several authors have reported this
increasing gap (Fryer and Levitt, 2005) and suggested possible explanations
(Austen-Smith and Fryer, 2005; Fryer and Levitt, 2006, and the references
therein).
A relatively unexplored explanation is that children deal with inter-temporal
problems, such as investment in education, in different ways. If time prefer-
ences, or the perceived benefits of patience, vary across demographic groups,
different educational paths may occur even if constraints to education are
lifted.2 Unfortunately, little is known about the nature of children’s time
preferences (an important exception is Bettinger and Slonim, 2007) and how
they relate to their social environment. In this paper, we investigate experi-
mentally if children’s time preferences vary across observable characteristics,
such as race and gender, and whether any observed differences relate to
behavior. In particular (and in contrast to Bettinger and Slonim), we in-
vestigate if measured time preferences correlate with markers of potential
educational failure.3
To elicit children’s time preferences, we conduct a series of artefactual
field experiments (Harrison and List, 2005). The experiments concentrate
on the population of 8th grade students of two large middle schools in a
district in the southern Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The
sample represents roughly half of the total 8th grade population in the dis-
1HOPE scholarships are available to all Georgia students who earned a high school
grade point average of at least a B.
2As suggested by Becker and Mulligan (1993), the evolution of time preferences can be
considered endogenous. Observed differences in preferences cannot be taken as evidence
of innate differences.
3Our research also differs from Bettinger and Slonim in that our sample represents
broader socio-economic characteristics.
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trict. The district was selected because it shares several characteristics with
poor communities throughout the South. We conducted the experiments
with populations of this age because the education literature recognizes that
this age is critical in determining future education outcomes, such as the
decision to drop out of school (Kaufman, Alt, and Chapman, 2004; Olson,
2006). In addition to the experiments, we collected data from the students’
records to further analyze the determinants of behavior. Being able to ac-
cess records allowed us to investigate the relationship between discount rates
and discipline. Discipline incidents have been found to be a good predictor
of high school drop-out rates and constitute an ideal test bed for the influ-
ence of time preference on behavior (Alexander, Entwisle, and Horsey, 1997;
Rumberger, 1995).
Our study provides two main findings. First, we observe that black boys
have significantly larger discount rates than any other demographic group.
We find that black girls are comparable to white girls and that white boys are
not significantly more impatient than any girls. This suggests that differences
in discount rates are not strictly race related. This finding is robust to
alternative measures of patience and regression analysis that controls for
socio-economic background and school performance. While differences in
discount rates might mask difference in risk preferences (Andersen, Harrison,
Lau and Rutstrom, 2008) or the existence of field substitutes for lending or
borrowing (Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2003; Cubitt and Read, 2007), we
find these explanations unlikely. The estimated difference in discount rates
among black boys and girls is large. Explaining this difference would require
that black boys are substantially more risk averse than black girls, or that
black boys have access to high-return investment opportunities not available
to black girls.
Our second main finding is that discount rates predict the likelihood that
a child has above average disciplinary referrals. We show that an extra stan-
dard deviation in a child’s discount rate is associated with a 5% increase in
the probability of having at least 3 disciplinary referrals in a year (the aver-
age is 1.8). This result is important because it suggests that time preferences
have a separate impact on behavior apart from socio-economic background
and performance. Interestingly, we find evidence suggesting that this rela-
tionship is not due to reverse causality. In our sample, black girls are more
likely to receive disciplinary referrals than white girls. However, black girls
are no more impatient than white girls. Preferences seem to precede behav-
ior.
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Several authors have pointed out that non-cognitive factors can affect
school and labor market outcomes (see Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001;
Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua, 2006; Segal, 2006a; and the references within).
Our results indicate that time preferences are an important component of the
economic decisions of children and that experimental methods are a simple
and direct way to measure them. Importantly, experimental methods have
the advantage of using real stakes and being standardized. Standardized,
salient, incentives are important because, as shown by Segal (2006b), ability
tests can be biased when subjects differ in their motivation. Experiments
potentially provide a direct measure of underlying preferences that are less
likely to be biased by the returns to education, as discipline or effort might
be, or by measurement problems, as self-reported personality tests might.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the sample. Section
3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 discusses the distribution of
preferences and its relationship with behavior. Section 5 concludes.
2 Sample Selection
The setting for our study is Spalding County, Georgia, located on the south-
ern end of the Atlanta MSA. Although part of the vibrant metropolitan area
of Atlanta, demographic data on Spalding County resembles less the expo-
nential growth of the Atlanta area and more the persistently poor counties
of southern Georgia. In Spalding County, the child poverty rate is 21.7%
(17.1% in Georgia) and per capita income is $16,791 ($21,154 in Georgia).
Thirty-two percent of the population over 25 in Spalding County have
not completed high school in 2000 - over 50% higher than for Georgia. Only
8% of adults completed a Bachelor’s degree or higher (24% in Georgia). The
high school dropout rate in school year 2000-01 was 15.6 per 100 enrolled,
more than double the state average of 6.4. Less than half (46.8%) of the class
of 2001 that entered in ninth grade, graduated (71.1% rate in Georgia). By
2004 the official non-completion rate was 46 percent.
Our experiment was conducted at Cowan Road and Taylor Street Middle
Schools, two of four middle schools in the Spalding County School District.
Whereas Bettinger and Slonim (2007) focused on free and reduced-price lunch
students ranging from five to sixteen years of age (n=191), we focus on
a broader range of socio-economic backgrounds but a narrower age range
(n=581). At the time of the experiment, 95% of our subjects were 13 or 14
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years old (mean=13.90, SD=0.53), while the remaining 5% were 15 years old.
We chose this age group because, nationally, 35% of students lost in the high
school pipeline are lost at the end of 9th grade and in Georgia, students can
make the decision to drop out of school at the age of 16. Thus, we wanted
to elicit discount rates in the period prior to when this important decision
would be made.
3 Experimental Design
In the economics literature, several methods have been used to estimate dis-
count rates among adults. Three are revealed preference methods: 1) econo-
metric estimation from observations of the use of financial instruments (e.g.,
Ausubel 1991) or of the purchase of durable consumer goods (e.g., Gately,
1980; Hartman and Doane, 1986; Hausman 1979; Ruderman et al., 1986);
2) natural experiments in which individuals are forced to choose among al-
ternative payoffs with differential time dimensions (e.g., Warner and Pleeter
(2001), who took advantage of data generated from an early retirement pro-
gram in the U.S. military to estimate discount rates for enlisted men and
officers); and 3) controlled experiments in which subjects are offered real
monetary payoffs that vary in their timing (Holcomb and Nelson, 1992; Pen-
der, 1996; Coller and Williams; 1999; Harrison et al., 2002; Eckel et al., 2003;
Meier and Sprenger, 2006; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007). Stated preference
methods, in which discount rates are elicited by asking individuals to make
hypothetical choices in the revealed preference settings described above, are
also used (Thaler, 1981; Loewenstein, 1988; Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley,
1993; Curtis 2002; Bradford et al. 2004).
Given the potential sources of bias inherent in stated preference methods,
and the difficulty in observing the consumption and investment decisions of
children, we use a controlled experiment. Psychologists, and more recently,
economists, have used experiments to study time preferences among children.
However, these studies look at the factors that affect “patience,” which is
defined as a binary choice to forgo short-term benefits for larger and longer-
term rewards. None of the studies explicitly define and characterize discount
rates. To do this, we adopt the front-end delay method used by Harrison
et al. (2002). In our experiment, subjects are asked, orally and in writing,
to make twenty decisions in total. For each decision, subjects are asked if
they would prefer $49 one month from now or $49+$X seven months from
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now. The amount of money, $X, is strictly positive and increases over the
twenty decisions. The decision sheet that the subject sees is shown in Table 1.
Subjects did not see the last column indicating the implied annual discount
rate. For example, in the first decision, a subject is asked if she would prefer
$49 one month from now or $50.83 seven months from now. And, in the ninth
decision, a subject is asked if she would prefer $49 one month from now or
$67.61 seven months from now. Subjects are asked to make one choice for
each of the twenty decisions on the decision sheet. Based on discussions with
teachers and students at other schools, we determined that the range of $50
to $99 would be considered by adolescents to be “large” payoffs, but not so
large as to potentially cause problems with their parents.
Table 1. Subject Decision Sheet
Decision Paid One Month Paid Seven Months Implied Annual
From Now From Now Discount Rate
1 $49.00 $50.83 7.35%
2 $49.00 $52.71 14.7%
3 $49.00 $54.66 22.05%
4 $49.00 $56.66 29.40%
5 $49.00 $58.72 36.75%
6 $49.00 $60.85 44.10%
7 $49.00 $63.04 51.45%
8 $49.00 $65.29 58.80%
9 $49.00 $67.61 66.15%
10 $49.00 $70.00 73.50%
11 $49.00 $72.46 80.25%
12 $49.00 $74.99 88.20%
13 $49.00 $77.59 95.55%
14 $49.00 $80.27 102.90%
15 $49.00 $83.03 110.25%
16 $49.00 $85.86 117.60%
17 $49.00 $88.78 124.95%
18 $49.00 $91.77 132.30%
19 $49.00 $94.85 139.65%
20 $49.00 $98.02 147.00%
Harrison et al.’s (2002) decision sheet includes the implied annual interest
rate and annual effective interest rate associated with each delayed payment
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option. However, our discussions with teachers at the study site and with
similar aged students at other schools led us to believe that students do not
price field investments in terms of interest rates. Thus information on rates
would simply confuse students. Coller and Williams (1999) and Harrison
et al. (2002) also argue that one should elicit the market rates of interest
that subjects face so that one can control for arbitrage opportunities (field
censoring) in the econometric analysis. Because our subjects are children,
we feel comfortable assuming that they do not incorporate credit market
options into their experimental decision task. If subjects were to have access
to credit markets, and these interest rates were binding in the experiment,
our estimates would be lower bounds on the true discount rates.
Economic theories of discounting predict that an individual faced with
the decision sheet in Table 1 would either choose (a) $49 for all decisions,
(b) the higher payment for all decisions, or (c) $49 for a certain number of
decisions starting with Decision 1 and then switch to the higher payment
for the remaining decisions. In other words, if an individual chose to re-
ceive $Y in seven months rather than $49 in one month, then the individual
will prefer any amount $Z > $Y in seven months rather than $49 in one
month. Following Harrison et al. (2002), we call these individuals “consis-
tent” decision-makers.4
However, in experiments using decision sheets like the one in Table 1,
some individuals are “inconsistent” decision-makers: they choose $Y in seven
months rather than $49 in one month, but then choose $49 in one month
rather than $Z > $Y in seven months. Harrison et al. (2002) and Meier and
Sprenger (2006) found that 4% and 11%, respectively, of their adult sub-
jects were inconsistent in their choices. Bettinger and Slonim (2007), whose
subjects were between 5 and 16 years old, found that 34% of their sample
were inconsistent decision-makers. We return to the issue of inconsistent
decision-makers in Section 4.
In each room, subjects are assigned a unique identification code. This
code is private, and subjects do not know the identification codes of other
subjects. Subjects make their decisions by circling one amount, either $49 or
$49+$X, on their decision sheet. After subjects make their decisions, each
subject puts her decision sheet in an envelope and the envelopes are collected.
One decision out of the twenty decisions is randomly chosen for payment.
This is done by taking 20 index cards with the numbers 1-20 written on
4Bettinger and Slonim (2007) call them “rational.”
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them, shuffling them in front of the subjects, and asking a subject to choose
one card. The number on the card is the decision number to be paid for each
of the three subjects in each classroom who are chosen to receive payment.
So, for example, if decision 15 is chosen for payment and one of the winning
subjects circled $83.03, the subject would receive $83.03 in seven months. If
another subject circled $49, that subject would receive $49 in one month.
After determining the decision to be paid, all the envelopes are shuffled
in front of the subjects, and three envelopes per classroom are chosen for
payment. The identification codes of those chosen to receive payment are
written on the blackboard. Because identification codes are kept private by
each subject, no other subject knows which subjects have been chosen to
receive payment. Subjects who are chosen to receive payment are paid with
a Wal-Mart gift card by the school principal on the specific date for the
decision chosen. The school principal keeps the Wal-Mart gift cards in her
office and the names of the subjects who are chosen for payment. Within a
week of the experiment, the winning subjects stop by the principal’s office to
verify the gift card. On or within a week of the payment date, the subjects go
privately to the principal’s office to pick up their gift cards.5 For the subjects
chosen to be paid, their names and the amount of payment are kept private.
Subjects know all of these procedures before making their decisions.
In our experiment, 581 8th grade students participated (ages 13 to 15).
Seventy-two students were randomly chosen to be paid, and the average
payment was $68.22 (SD = $19.51), with a total payout of $4,933.56. Twenty-
nine received gift cards of $49 one month after the experiment. Seven months
after the experiment, one student received $52.71, one received $56.66, three
received $63.04, five received $67.61, two received $70, four received $72.46,
five received $74.99, two received $83.03, three received $85.86, three received
$91.77 and fourteen received the highest payment of $98.02. The experiments
were conducted in two sets. The first set was on September 19, 2006 at Cowan
Road Middle School, and the second set was on August 31, 2007 at Cowan
Road and Taylor Street Middle Schools. Subject characteristics are presented
in more detail in the next section.
5Children were informed that, should they move before the payment date, their Wal-
mart card would be forwarded to their new address. One winning subject transferred to
another school district prior to the date of payment. The principal found the student and
gave him/her the Wal-Mart gift card.
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4 Results
4.1 Instrument Check
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the population of students in the
experiment. Forty-seven percent of the subjects are male and 40.2% are
Black. Almost 60% of the children receive free or reduced price lunch and
21.5% are part of a special education program. According to their 7th grade
aptitude test, 21.1% of the children do not satisfy the math requirement for
their grade and 13.7% do not satisfy the reading requirements.
Table 2 also shows the proportion of kids that make at least one incon-
sistent decision in the experiment. Sixty-seven percent of the subjects make
consistent decisions and less than 10 percent make five or more inconsis-
tent decisions. The distribution of inconsistent behavior is not distributed
randomly. Black subjects are more likely to behave inconsistently. Gifted
children are the least likely to make inconsistent decisions, and children with
reading deficiencies are the most likely to make inconsistent decisions, fol-
lowed by children with math deficiencies.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean (s.e.) %Inconsistent Number
Choices (s.e.)
Age (years) 13.8 (0.2) 563
Male 47.5% 0.31 (0.03) 274
Female 52.6% 0.35 (0.03) 303
Black 40.2% 0.45 (0.03) 232
White 54.4% 0.26 (0.03) 314
Black Males 17.0% 0.42 (0.05) 98
Black Females 23.2% 0.47 (0.04) 134
White Males 28.9% 0.25 (0.03) 167
White Females 25.5% 0.27 (0.04) 147
Free & Reduced Lunch 59.8% 0.39 (0.03) 345
Special Education 21.5% 0.40 (0.04) 124
Gifted 10.8% 0.16 (0.05) 62
Poor Math 21.1% 0.45 (0.05) 115
Poor Reading 13.7% 0.48 (0.06) 75
7th Grade Discipline (number) 1.8 (0.1) 547
Note: Four subjects are missing basic demographic data on sex and race.
Additional subjects are missing data on age and test scores
(because they were not in the school system between testing and the experiment).
Table 3 presents the distribution of discount rates for all the subjects
and only for subjects that answered consistently. Discount rates are put in
ranges to make the presentation clearer. The discount rate of inconsistent
subjects is estimated by finding the distribution of choices that is consistent
and minimizes the total amount of money that would have to be spent to
adjust their behavior.6 As Table 3 makes clear, our procedure does not alter
the basic features of the distribution of discount rates. In comparison with
Harrison et al.’s (2002) experiment, our results suggests that children are
more impatient than adults.
6Let xij be the amount of money child i chooses from menu j and let X be the set of
all possible consistent patterns of behavior. Our estimates for inconsistent children are
based on the x̂ such that x̂ = argminx∈X
∑
j |xij − xj |.
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Table 3. Distribution of Preferences
Discount Rate Frequency (Percent)
(d.r.) Full Sample Consistent
d.r. ≤ 20 69 (11.9 ) 55 (14.2 )
20 < d.r. ≤ 40 51 (8.8 ) 31 (8.0 )
40 < d.r. ≤ 60 97 (16.7 ) 79 (20.4 )
60 < d.r. ≤ 80 84 (14.5 ) 67 (17.3 )
80 < d.r. ≤ 100 74 (12.7 ) 49 (12.6 )
100 < d.r. ≤ 120 34 (5.9 ) 20 (5.2 )
120 < d.r. ≤ 140 65 (11.2 ) 28 (7.2 )
d.r. > 140 107 (18.4 ) 59 (15.2 )
Total 581 388
4.2 Distribution of Preferences
Our first research question is whether measured time preferences relate to the
socio-economic characteristics of children. Table 4 summarizes the main re-
sults on the distribution of preferences of children. Table A1 in the Appendix
shows that these results also hold using regression analysis.
Table 4 shows that boys have larger discount rates than girls. Overall,
the discount rates of boys are 16 points larger among children that answered
consistently (13 points in the full sample). The same is true if preferences
are measured by the number of impatient decisions. Table 4 shows, however,
that the result that boys are more impatient than girls is race dependent.
While the discount rates of white boys are larger than those of white girls,
these differences are not statistically different.
The discount rates of black boys are between 22.5% and 33.9% larger
than those of black girls. Black boys make between 3 and 4 more impa-
tient decisions than black girls. As Table 4 shows, the difference in time
preferences cannot be explained by lack of understanding of the instrument.
The differences tend to be larger when the analysis is restricted to children
making consistent choices.
The experiments reveal that there are no statistically significant differ-
ences between races in general. However, the experiments show that black
boys possess larger discount rates than white boys. The discount rates of
black boys are between 14 and 17 points larger than that of white boys.
Also, the socio-economic background, as measured by qualifying for free
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or reduced lunch, does not explain differences in discount rates. That is,
the fact that black boys are more impatient cannot be attributed to their
economic condition. Black girls, who share the same economic background
as black boys,7 tend to be as or more patient than white girls. Ability,
however, seems to play a role in the measurement of discount rates. Children
with math deficiencies have larger discount rates, as do children with reading
deficiencies. Given the small number of children with reading deficiencies in
our sample, we suspect that reading deficiencies capture other characteristics
related to patience.
That black boys consistently have larger discount rates than any other
demographic group is puzzling. As Table 4 shows, this cannot be explained
by either sex, race or income. Indeed, the distribution of discount rates of
black boys (see Table A2 in the appendix) suggests that impatience is not
distributed uniformly across black boys. In particular, 33% of black boys
have discount rates above 140%. In comparison, only 14.3% of white girls,
19.4% of black girls and 14.4% of white boys have discount rates above 140%.
The differences are even clearer if we concentrate on children that answered
consistently. In this subsample, 13.1% of white girls, 9.9% of black girls,
12.8% of white boys and 35.1% of black boys have discount rates above
140%. This suggests that there is a large group of black boys that behave
extremely impatiently.
Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstro¨m (2008) argue that differences in
discount rates can instead reflect differences in risk preferences. In partic-
ular, relatively more risk averse subjects will appear more impatient. Our
experiments do not collect independent data on risk preferences. However,
assuming that subjects possess constant relative risk aversion preferences, it
can be shown that black boys would require a 0.15 larger coefficient of risk
aversion than black girls to account for the differences in discount rates.8
Previous research on risk preferences of 9th grade students in Dallas, Texas
shows no difference in the distribution of risk preferences between black boys
and black girls.9 Bettinger and Slonim (2007) collected independent data on
7The probability that a black boy or a black girl qualify for free or reduced meals is
not statistically different (p-value = .673)
8To put this number in context, a person with 0.15 larger coefficient of relative risk
aversion would be willing to receive between $30 and $110 less for a lottery ticket that
pays $1000 and $0 with equal probability.
9This result was confirmed through personal communication with Catherine Eckel (Uni-
versity of Texas-Dallas).
11
risk preferences and find that it has no effect on time preferences.
Alternatively, these differences in discount rates are possible if only black
boys have more profitable alternatives to invest money than what is offered
in the experiment. Given that the differences in discount rates are largely
explained by the over representation of discount rates above 140% among
black boys, this explanation would suggest exceedingly large potential gains
in the field.
An open question is what explains the large differences in the time prefer-
ences of children. Table A3 presents additional regressions of discount rates
on a series of personal and household characteristics. The regressions use in-
formation collected from a short take-home questionnaire given to the parents
of the 2007 experimental participants. The 2006 experimental participants
had already graduated from middle school and could not be contacted. Of the
380 children, 141 returned a questionnaire. This represent a 37% response
rate, and the results should be taken as preliminary. Column 4 in Table A3
shows that while the parents of children with poor math or reading skills
are less likely to respond to the questionnaire, column 3 shows that the time
preferences of children of non-responding households are no different from
those of responding households. Importantly, Table A3 shows that the fact
that black boys are significantly more impatient holds after controlling for
household structure, family size, marital status of parents and employment
conditions. This suggests that environmental variables might be important
in the evolution of the preferences of children. Importantly, we find that
children with at least one parent having completed college have significantly
smaller discount rates than children in households without a college-graduate
parent. This correlation could be due to a variety of factors, including an
income effect or an expectation of the child’s educational achievement.
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4.3 Economic Consequences of Time Preferences
As argued by Bowles, Gintis and Osborne (2001) and Heckman, Stixrud
and Urzua (2006), non-cognitive abilities have influence in educational and
labor market outcomes. In this section, we investigate our second research
question, if measured discount rates affect the likelihood a child receives a
disciplinary referral. The number of discipline acts incurred by a child has
been found to be a good predictor of the child’s decision to drop out of
school and of lower average lifetime earnings (Segal, 2006a; Neild, Balfanz
and Herzog, 2007; Viadero, 2006).
Our measure of discipline is based on the number of disciplinary referrals
during seventh grade. A disciplinary referral happens when a student is sent
to the administrative office (by a teacher, administrator or bus driver) and
the behavior is entered into the student’s data file (i.e. reprimand, detention,
suspension, etc.). This does not include referrals to the office that do not
result in a recorded entry in the student’s data file. On average, a child
receives a referral 1.8 times during seventh grade. However, the distribution is
highly concentrated. Seventy-five percent of the children have no disciplinary
referrals at all. Moreover, the distribution of disciplinary referrals depends
on the gender and race of the child. A black boy is disciplined 3.3 times while
a white boy is disciplined 1.8 times on average. A black girl is disciplined
2 times while a white girl is disciplined only 0.7 times. In what follows, we
will analyze disciplinary referrals using an indicator variable that equals 1 if
a child has 3 discipline referrals or more. The analysis is similar if we use
other indicator functions or use negative binomial regressions to account for
the nature of the data.
Table 5 presents the estimates of a linear probability model with het-
eroskedastic corrected standard errors for disciplinary referrals for different
sub-populations.10 For completeness, the table includes the subsample of
subjects that made decisions consistently. Table 5 shows that for the sub-
sample of consistent subjects discount rates predict disciplinary referrals,
controlling for covariates. Our estimation indicates that an increase of one
standard deviation in the discount rate increases the probability of having
more than 2 disciplinary referrals by 5% (48.5×0.0011 = 0.05).11 This effect
is half the size of the impact that qualifying for free or reduced lunch has
10The qualitative results are similar if a probit is used instead.
11The overall mean discount rate for consistent subjects in Table 5 is 74.3 (standard
deviation 48.5).
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and it is comparable to that of being gifted (but in the opposite direction).
The estimates using the full sample and estimated discount rates suggest
that these results are subject to measurement problems. Regressions using
subsamples of the data offer additional evidence of the relationship between
discount rates and discipline.
Regressions using only the data for boys confirm that discount rates mat-
ter. The estimate using the subsample of consistent children show that an
increase of one standard deviation in the discount rate increase the likelihood
of having more than 2 discipline referrals by 11% (48.08 × 0.0023 = 0.11).
The impact is 6% (47.31 × 0.0012 = 0.06) in the full sample of consistent
and inconsistent boys. One might suspect that our measure of discount rates
confounds the effect of race in the regression for boys. However, this is not
the case. The regression for the sub-population of white children shows that
discount rates have a separate impact from either gender or ability. The
estimates show that an additional standard deviation in the discount rate in-
creases the probability of having more than two disciplinary referrals between
8% (45.87× 0.0018 = 0.08) and 5% (46.31× 0.0011 = 0.05).
A major concern is whether the relationship between discount rates and
disciplinary referrals is causal. It is possible that disciplinary referrals are
correlated with unequal treatment that in turn affects the expectations of
those being punished. The regression using girls’ responses gives us evidence
against a reverse causality argument. As noted above, black girls are dis-
ciplined significantly more frequently than white girls. However, there is
no evidence that black girls have larger discount rates than white girls. If
punishment produces impatience we would expect the opposite. This dif-
ferential treatment of black girls seems to explain the lack of importance of
discount rates in explaining disciplinary referrals among black children as
well. Overall, the results show that discount rates matter for behavior.12
12Discipline data might reflect unequal treatment towards black boys. To address this
hypothesis, in the future, we will collect data on schools with only Black teachers.
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5 Conclusions
We investigate the distribution of time preferences of children. We collected
data from 581 students in the 8th grade from a district in the southern
MSA of Atlanta, Georgia. We find that black boys stand out in terms of
their discount rates. Black boys have the largest discount rates compared to
any other demographic group. Neither race, socio-economic background nor
academic performance are able to explain the difference in time preferences
among black boys.13 Importantly, we find a high degree of heterogeneity
in children’s preferences but more so among black boys. The difference in
discount rates of black boys is explained by their overrepresentation among
children with extremely high discount rates.
Our research shows that time preferences matter and predict the occur-
rence of disciplinary referrals. One standard deviation in the discount rate
increases the probability of receiving at least 3 disciplinary referrals in a year
by 5%. Importantly, we do not find evidence that disciplinary actions in-
crease a child’s discount rates. Black girls are punished more frequently, but
they are no more impatient than white girls. To our knowledge, this is the
first experimental work on time preferences among children that provides
evidence of a relationship between preferences and outcomes.
Our research shows that experimental methods are important not only
in detecting differences in the population, but perhaps as a starting point to
improve our understanding of divergent life paths.
13Bettinger and Slonim (2006) collected rich data on time preferences on a sample that
included children of different ages. Their results, as ours, show that there is no difference
in time preferences based on race. Regression analysis shows that a dummy variable for
black children is not significant even if the dummy for black boys is removed. They do
not report within race differences in behavior.
17
6 References
Alexander, K. L., D. R. Entwisle, and C. S. Horsey. 1997. From First Grade
Forward: Foundations of High School Dropout. Sociology of Education, 70
(2), 87-107.
Andersen, S., G. Harrison, M. Lau and E. Rutstro¨m. 2008. forthcoming.
Eliciting Risk and Time Preferences. Econometrica.
Austen-Smith, D. and R. Fryer. 2005. An Economic Analysis of ’Acting
White.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 2005, pp. 551-83.
Ausubel, L. M. 1991. The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card
Market. American Economic Review 81(1): 50-81.
Becker, G.S. and C.B. Mulligan. 1997. The Endogenous Determinants of
Time Preferences. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(3): 729-758.
Benzion, U., A. Rapoport, and J. Yagil. 1989. Discount Rates Inferred
from Decisions: an experimental study. Management Science 35: 270-284.
Bettinger, E. and R. Slonim. 2007. Patience among Children. Journal of
Public Economics 91(1-2): 343-363.
Bowles, S., H. Gintis and M. Osborne. 2001. The Determinants of Earn-
ings: A Behavioral Approach. Journal of Economic Literature 39: 1137-76.
Bradford D., J. Zoller, G. Silvestrii. 2004. Estimating the Effect of
Individual Time Preferences on the Demand for Preventative Health Care.
CHEPS Working Paper 007-04, March.
Coller, M. and M.B. Williams. 1999. Eliciting Individual Discount Rates.
Experimental Economics 2(2): 107-127.
Cubitt, R. and D. Read. 2007. Can intertemporal choice experiments
elicit time preferences for consumption? Experimental Economics 10: 369–
389.
Curtis, J. 2002. Estimates of Fishermen’s Personal Discount Rate. Ap-
plied Economics Letters 9(12): 775-78
Eckel, C., C. Johnson and C. Montmarquette. 2005. Human Capital
Investment by the Poor: Calibrating Policy with Laboratory Experiments.
Working Paper.
Fryer, R. and S. Levitt. 2005. The Black-White Test Score Gap Through
Third Grade. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Papers
11049.
Fryer, R. and S. Levitt. 2006. Testing for Racial Differences in the Mental
Ability of Young Children. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working
Papers 12066.
18
Gately, D. 1980. Individual discount rates and the purchase and uti-
lization of energy-using durables: comment. Bell Journal of Economics 11:
(373-374).
Harrison, G.W., M. Lau and M. Williams. 2002. Estimating Individual
Discount Rates for Denmark: a field experiment. American Economic Review
92(5): 1606-1617.
Harrison, G.W., M. Lau, E.E. Rutstrom, and M.B. Sullivan. 2005. Elicit-
ing Risk and Time Preferences Using Field Experiments: Some Methodologi-
cal Issues. In Field Experiments in Economics, J. Carpenter, G. W. Harrison
and J. A. List, eds. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Research in Experimental
Economics, Volume 10, pp. 125-218.
Harrison, G. and J. List. 2004. Field Experiments. Journal of Economic
Literature, 4: 1009-55.
Hartman, R. S., and M. J. Doane. 1986. Household Discount Rates
Revisited. The Energy Journal 7: 139-48.
Hausman, J.A, 1979. Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and
Utilization of Energy-Using Durables. Bell Journal of Economics 10: 33-54.
Heckman, J., J. Stixrud and S. Urzua. 2006. The Effects of Cognitive
and Noncognitive Abilities on Labor and Social Behavior. NBER Working
Paper 12006.
Holcomb, J.H. and P.S. Nelson. 1992. Another Experimental Look at
Individual Time Preference.” Rationality and Society 4: 199-220.
Kaufman, P., M. N. Alt, and C. D. Chapman. 2004. Dropout Rates
in the United States. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for
Education Statistics.
Meier, S. and C. Sprenger. 2006. Impatience and Credit Behavior: evi-
dence from a field experiment. Working Paper, October.
Neild, R.C., R. Balfanz, and L. Herzog. 2007. An Early Warning System.
Educational Leadership, 64(2), 28-33.
Olson, L. 2006. The Down Staircase. In Diplomas Count: An Essential
Guide to Graduation Policy and Rates. Special issue of Education Week,
Vol. 25(41S).
Pender, J.L. 1996. Discount Rates and Credit Markets: Theory and
Evidence from Rural India. Journal of Development Economics 50: 257-296.
Ruderman, H., M. Levine, and J. McMahon. 1986. Energy Efficiency
Choice in the Purchase of Residential Appliances. In Energy Efficiency: Per-
spectives on Individual Behavior, W. Kempton and M. Neiman, eds. Ameri-
can Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, pp. 41-50.
19
Rumberger, R. W. 1995. Dropping Out of Middle School: A Multilevel
Analysis of Students and Schools. American Educational Research Journal,
32 (3), 583-625.
Segal, C. 2006a. Misbehavior, Education, and Labor Market Outcomes.
Pompeu Fabra University. Working paper.
Segal, C. 2006b. Motivation, Test Scores, and Economic Success. Harvard
Business School, working paper.
Shelley, M.K. 1993. Outcome Signs, Question Frames and Discount
Rates. Management Science 39: 806-815.
Thaler, R. H. 1981. Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic Inconsistency.
Economics Letters 8: 201-207.
Viadero, D. 2006. Signs of Early Exit for Dropouts Abound. Educational
Week, 25(41S), 17-24.
Warner, J. T. and S. Pleeter. 2001. The Personal Discount Rate: ev-
idence from military downsizing programmes. American Economic Review
91: 33-53.
20
7. Appendix
Table A1. Regression Analysis of Discount Rates
Interval Regressionsa Count Regressionsb
Variable Discount Rates Impatient Decisions
Male 5.883 6.220 0.067 0.092
5.612 5.457 0.069 0.067
Black -9.188 -7.369 -0.029 0.009
6.350 6.171 0.086 0.086
Black Male 21.456∗∗ 18.144∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.198∗
8.641 8.384 0.108 0.108
Other 2.901 10.377 -0.035 0.062
14.687 14.135 0.210 0.216
Other Male 36.297 32.148 0.329 0.284
25.156 24.311 0.266 0.262
Gifted 0.582 -1.984 -0.068 -0.133
7.206 7.252 0.094 0.096
Special Education 0.739 0.178 -0.044 -0.082
5.867 5.777 0.072 0.076
Reading Poor -20.273∗∗ -15.721∗ -0.264∗ -0.277∗∗
8.741 8.618 0.137 0.130
Math Poor -9.260 -13.159∗∗ -0.018 -0.051
6.685 6.638 0.086 0.090
Reading & Math Poor 12.687 11.259 0.127 0.113
12.705 12.251 0.190 0.180
Free & Reduced Meal -8.017 -6.237 -0.054 -0.028
5.150 5.014 0.068 0.066
Constant 65.806∗∗∗ 53.286∗∗∗ 2.264∗∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗
4.865 12.482 0.059 0.173
Experimenter Dummies No Yes No Yes
Room Dummies No Yes No Yes
N 545 545 545 545
log Likelihood -1714.4 -1686.7 -1733.8 -1715.0
Standard errors below coefficients, ∗ p-value < .1, ∗∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗∗ p-value < .01
a Interval regression that permits censoring at final decision, bNegative binomial regression.
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Table A2. Distribution of Preferences by Sex and Race
Discount Rate Women (Percent) Men (Percent)
(d.r.) White Black White Black
d.r. ≤ 20 22 (15.0 ) 29 (21.6 ) 17 (10.2 ) 14 (14.3 )
20 < d.r. ≤ 40 12 (8.2 ) 7 (5.2 ) 9 (5.4 ) 1 (1.0 )
40 < d.r. ≤ 60 25 (17.0 ) 25 (18.7 ) 30 (18.0 ) 8 (8.2 )
60 < d.r. ≤ 80 24 (16.3 ) 12 (9.0 ) 30 (18.0 ) 12 (12.2 )
80 < d.r. ≤ 100 18 (12.2 ) 17 (12.7 ) 25 (15.0 ) 10 (10.2 )
100 < d.r. ≤ 120 9 (6.1 ) 5 (3.7 ) 8 (4.8 ) 9 (9.2 )
120 < d.r. ≤ 140 16 (10.9 ) 13 (9.7 ) 24 (14.4 ) 11 (11.2 )
d.r. > 140 21 (14.3 ) 26 (19.4 ) 24 (14.4 ) 33 (33.7 )
Total 147 134 167 98
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Table A3. Time Preferences and Family Background
Interval Regressions OLS
Discount Rates Responded
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Male 6.845 1.778 2.429 0.017
8.859 9.022 6.407 0.059
Gifted 5.382 5.986 7.490 0.085
9.925 9.726 7.561 0.064
Special Education -5.145 -0.882 4.207 -0.093
11.025 10.436 10.436 0.060
Reading Poor 6.836 11.087 -1.606 -0.230∗
14.139 12.233 18.393 0.133
Math Poor 0.889 -3.691 -16.662∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
20.517 19.267 8.459 0.056
Reading & Math Poor -28.169 -31.259 5.427 0.287∗
31.519 29.179 23.256 0.161
Black -22.907∗∗ -21.196∗∗ -13.546∗ -0.068
10.675 10.681 7.705 0.066
Black Male 25.391∗ 29.129∗∗ 23.724∗∗ 0.012
14.481 14.669 11.337 0.091
Other -22.298 -21.340 -19.099 0.098
26.074 26.744 14.215 0.148
Other Male 90.207∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗
30.066 0.158
Intact Household 3.546 -1.861
10.839 9.232
Married Parents 6.254 13.565
12.429 10.588
One Parent(s) has a College Degree -17.802∗∗ -17.703∗∗
7.249 7.142
Child Support -10.635 -8.178
9.987 9.915
Employed 5.607 5.184
8.164 8.164
Owned Household 3.898 8.803
8.913 9.570
Household Members 0.899 3.537
3.901 3.658
Cowan -23.695∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗
8.154 0.047
Responded -6.481
6.008
Constant 66.310∗∗∗ 10.930 50.355∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
17.175 18.955 7.831 0.051
Room & Experimenter Dummies No Yes Yes No
N 153 153 353 353
Log-Likehood -458.25 -445.06 -1087.4603 0.336+
Standard errors below coefficients, ∗ p-value < .1, ∗∗ p-value < .05, ∗∗∗ p-value < .01
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